The Politics of Revenue Bargaining in Africa Triggers, Processes, and Outcomes

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This book examines the politics of revenue bargaining in Africa at a time when attention to domestic revenue mobilization has expanded immensely. Measures to increase taxes and other revenues can - but do not always - lead to a process of bargaining, where revenue providers negotiate for some kind of return. This book offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries: Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. The case studies all draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what triggers revenue bargaining; how these processes unfold; and finally, if and when they result in an agreement - whether that is a fiscal contract or not. From these empirically rich case narratives emerges a story of how power and initial bargaining position influence not only whether bargaining occurs in the first place, but also the processes and their outcomes. Less resourceful taxpayers find it harder to raise their voice, but in some cases even these groups manage to ally with other civil society groups to protest tax reforms they perceive as unfair. Indirect taxes such as VAT often trigger protests, as do sudden changes in tax practices. Revenue providers rarely call for improved services in return for paying tax, which would be expected to nurture the foundation for a fiscal social contract. Instead, revenue providers are more likely to negotiate for tax reductions, implying that governments' efforts to increase revenue are impeded. Indeed, we find many instances of state-society reciprocity when ruling elites try to be responsive to revenue providers' demands. The Politics of Revenue Bargaining in Africa hence provides insights into the nature and dynamics not only of revenue bargaining but of policymaking in general as well as its implications for state-society reciprocity in Africa.

Anne Mette Kjær, Professor of Political Science, Aarhus University,Marianne S. Ulriksen, Associate Professor at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies, University of Southern Denmark,Ane Karoline Bak, Assistant Professor at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies, University of Southern Denmark

Anne Mette Kjær is a Professor of Political Science at Aarhus University with a focus on the Politics of Development. She holds a PhD in Political Science and 25 years of experience in development research and practice. She has taught and researched in the fields of public administration, governance, and development, and has contributed to international research on a wide range of related issues. She currently chairs the Council for Development Policy.

Marianne S. Ulriksen is Associate Professor at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark (SDU) and Senior Research Associate to the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg. She heads the interdisciplinary project JUST SOCIETY at SDU. Her research areas include political economy of welfare policy development; social protection, state-society relations, and social justice; poverty and inequality; and resource mobilization and taxation with a primary focus on Southern and Eastern Africa.


Ane Karoline Bak is Assistant Professor at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark, where she works on the JUST SOCIETY project. Her research examines the politics of taxation and the role of taxation in state-society relations and (welfare) state building through mainly qualitative and comparative methods. Her empirical focus has been on sub-Saharan Africa, specializing in Senegal in particular.

1. Politicization of taxation and state-society reciprocity in Africa, Anne Mette Kjær, Marianne S. Ulriksen, and Ane Karoline Bak
2. Unpacking revenue bargaining: Triggers, processes, and outcomes, Marianne S. Ulriksen, Ane Karoline Bak, and Anne Mette Kjær
3. We pay, we act? Conditions for collective action among women informal traders in urban Tanzania, Ane Edslev Jacobsen
4. Triggers and strategies of revenue bargaining: Evidence from Mozambican municipalities, Armin von Schiller
5. Tax reforms in Tanzania: Where and how are compromises negotiated?, Marianne S. Ulriksen, Lucas Katera, and Jamal Msami
6. Lobbying in tax policy making: The case of VAT reform in Tanzania, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Lise Rakner
7. Service provision or tax exemptions: Revenue bargaining in Uganda's agricultural sector, Anne Mette Kjær and Clayton Arinanye
8. Maximizing tax and other revenues for strategic rents in Uganda's petroleum sector, Dan Ngabirano
9. Campaign financing and revenue bargaining in Tanzania and Uganda, Moses Khisa, Jamal Msami, and Ole Therkildsen
10. A third party at the table: How donors and chiefs influence revenue bargaining in Togo, Rachel Beach
11. Who should pay? Government and donor bargaining over social protection funding in Tanzania, Marianne S. Ulriksen, Flora Myamba, and Constantine George
12. Brokered fiscal contracts: Shifting bargaining positions of Senegal's informal commercial sector, Ane Karoline Bak
13. Conclusion: The politics of revenue bargaining in Africa, Ane Karoline Bak, Anne Mette Kjær, and Marianne S. Ulriksen